Minimal Modeling Adaptive Control of the NASA Generic Transport Model with Unknown Control-Surface Faults by Yu, Ming-Jui et al.
Minimal Modeling Adaptive Control of the NASA Generic
Transport Model with Unknown Control-Surface Faults
Ming-Jui Yu ∗, Yousaf Rahman †, Ella M. Atkins ‡,
Ilya V. Kolmanovsky §, and Dennis S. Bernstein¶
University of Michigan, 1320 Beal Ave., Ann Arbor, MI 48109
Sudden or gradual faults in sensors, actuators, and processors can have catastrophic
consequences for plants that depend on control technology. This paper applies adaptive
control to an aircraft with unknown control-surface faults and investigates the robustness of
the controller to uncertainties in the aircraft dynamics. Control-surface faults include mag-
nitude and rate saturation, deadzone, and jams in the ailerons and rudder. Retrospective
cost adaptive control (RCAC) is applied in both centralized and constrained architectures
with a single tuning for each architecture in order to compare the range of unknown faults
that RCAC can compensate for through on-line adaptation. The results show that the
centralized controller architecture can generally compensate for a larger range of fault pa-
rameters. We then characterize the robustness of the centralized controller architecture
with respect to erroneous prior modeling information.
I. Introduction
The use of control as an enabling technology can be potentially disastrous when that technology
fails. In particular, sudden or gradual faults in sensors, actuators, and processors can have catastrophic
consequences for plants that depend on control technology. By the same token, a control system that can
reconfigure and adapt to faults may have the ability to compensate for significantly off-nominal conditions
[10]. In this way, control technology can enhance safety rather than decrease reliability.
The most straightforward approach to compensate for faults is to ascertain that a fault has occurred,
determine the nature of the fault, and modify the control system based on the fault conditions. The modified
control system may be based on prior analysis and synthesis, with verification and validation performed prior
to operation.
In practice, however, it may not be possible to identify the onset or nature of a fault. This motivates
the need to address faults whose onset and nature are unknown. In addition, unknown faults may require a
control system that can adapt to off-nominal conditions that go beyond anticipated plant variations.
In the present paper we address the problem of unknown faults by using the nonlinear Generic Trans-
port Model (GTM) simulation developed by NASA [1, 11] in support of a scaled flight vehicle [9]. The GTM
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simulation includes sensor and actuator models that can be modified to simulate a wide variety of faults,
such as jammed control surfaces. Most of the aerodynamic and electromechanical components of the GTM
model can be modified to simulate the effects of unknown faults.
To investigate the ability to compensate for unknown, sudden-onset faults, we apply retrospective cost
adaptive control (RCAC) to the GTM simulation. RCAC is a direct digital control approach that operates at
a fixed sample rate dictated by hardware or chosen to reflect the control bandwidth required by the aircraft
dynamics, commands, and disturbances. RCAC is applicable to linear plants that are possibly MIMO,
nonminimum phase (NMP), and unstable [2, 3, 6–8, 12]. RCAC relies on knowledge of Markov parameters
and, for NMP open-loop-unstable plants, estimates of the NMP zeros. This information can be obtained from
either analytical modeling or system identification [5]. RCAC does not require that the plant uncertainty
and disturbances be matched with the control inputs, and no information about the disturbance spectrum
is needed. RCAC was applied to the NASA GTM model in [4].
As a first step in considering the ability of RCAC to address unknown faults, we consider four types
of input nonlinearities to represent unknown control-surface faults. These nonlinearities are magnitude
saturation, rate saturation, deadzone, and jammed control surfaces. Although all control surfaces are subject
to magnitude and rate saturation, we consider the possibility that the magnitude and rate saturation limits
are reduced below the nominal limits. We also consider deadzone nonlinearities, where the control surface
remains at its trim deflection until a minimum command is reached. Finally, a jammed control surface
remains at a fixed value away from trim, ignoring all commands issued by the control law. All of these faults
are assumed to be sudden and unknown to the controller.
For the next step, we further characterize the robustness of the controller under emergency conditions
by varying the prior information provided to the controller. Each of the first five Markov parameters of the
linearized aircraft dynamics is correctly identified and provided to RCAC as the matrix H̃, and we compare
the performance under unknown jammed actuator faults. We then extend the investigation by testing the
controller’s sensitivity to uncertainty in the choice of Markov parameters. The matrix H̃ remains unchanged
while we vary the controller’s estimate of H̃. The performance of each instance under unknown jammed
actuator faults is then compared.
We consider two implementations of RCAC. One is a centralized version of RCAC, while the other is
a constrained architecture. These implementations are described in Section 3.
II. Adaptive Controller Design
II.A. Problem Formulation
Consider the MIMO discrete-time system
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) +Bu(k) +D1w(k), (1)
y(k) = Cx(k) +D2w(k), (2)
z(k) = E1x(k) + E0w(k), (3)
where x(k) ∈ Rn, y(k) ∈ Rly , z(k) ∈ Rlz , u(k) ∈ Rlu , w(k) ∈ Rlw , and k ≥ 0. Our goal is to develop
an adaptive output feedback controller that minimizes the performance variable z in the presence of the
exogenous signal w with minimal modeling information about the dynamics and w. Note that w can
represent either a command signal to be followed, an external disturbance to be rejected, or both. The
system (1)–(3) can represent a sampled-data application arising from a continuous-time system with sample
and hold operations.
If D1 = 0 and E0 6= 0, then the objective is to have the output E1x follow the command signal
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−E0w. On the other hand, if D1 6= 0 and E0 = 0, then the objective is to reject the disturbance w













, then the objective is to have E1x follow the command −Ê0w2 while rejecting the
disturbance w1. Lastly, if D1 and E0 are empty matrices, then the objective is output stabilization, that is,
convergence of z to zero.
II.B. Retrospective Cost





For example, H1 = E1B and H2 = E1AB. Let r be a positive integer. Then, for all k ≥ r,
x(k) = Arx(k − r) +
r∑
i=1
Ai−1Bu(k − i) +
r∑
i=1
Ai−1D1w(k − i), (5)
and thus
z(k) = E1A




















Next, we rearrange the columns of H̄ and the components of Ū(k − 1) and partition the resulting matrix
and vector so that
H̄Ū(k − 1) = H′U ′(k − 1) + HU(k − 1), (7)
where H′ ∈ Rlz×(rlu−lU ), H ∈ Rlz×lU , U ′(k− 1) ∈ Rrlu−lU , and U(k− 1) ∈ RlU . Then, we can rewrite (6) as









i−1D1w(k − i) + E0w(k) + H′U ′(k − 1). (9)
Next, for j = 1, . . . , s, we rewrite (8) with a delay of kj time steps, where 0 ≤ k1 ≤ k2 ≤ · · · ≤ ks, in
the form
z(k − kj) = Sj(k − kj) + HjUj(k − kj − 1), (10)
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i−1D1w(k − kj − i) + E0w(k − kj) +H′jU ′j(k − kj − 1) (11)
and (7) becomes
H̄Ū(k − kj − 1) = H′jU ′j(k − kj − 1) + HjUj(k − kj − 1), (12)
where H′j ∈ R
lz×(rlu−lUj ), Hj ∈ Rlz×lUj , U ′j(k − kj − 1) ∈ R
rlu−lUj , and Uj(k − kj − 1) ∈ RlUj . Now, by





















 ∈ Rslz , (15)
Ũ(k − 1) has the form




u(k − qlŨ )
 ∈ RlŨ , (16)
where, for i = 1, . . . , lŨ , k1 ≤ qi ≤ ks + r, and H̃ ∈ Rslz×lŨ is constructed according to the structure of
Ũ(k− 1). The vector Ũ(k− 1) is formed by stacking U1(k− k1 − 1), . . . , Us(k− ks − 1) and removing copies
of repeated components.
Next, we define the retrospective performance
ẑ(k − kj)
4
= Sj(k − kj) + HjÛj(k − kj − 1), (17)
where the past controls Uj(k − kj − 1) in (10) are replaced by the surrogate controls Ûj(k − kj − 1). In








 ∈ Rslz (18)
and thus is given by
Ẑ(k) = S̃(k) + H̃ ˆ̃U(k − 1), (19)
where the components of ˆ̃U(k − 1) ∈ RlŨ are the components of Û1(k − k1 − 1), . . . , Ûs(k − ks − 1) ordered
in the same way as the components of Ũ(k − 1). Subtracting (14) from (19) yields
Ẑ(k) = Z(k)− H̃Ũ(k − 1) + H̃ ˆ̃U(k − 1). (20)
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Finally, we define the retrospective cost function
J( ˆ̃U(k − 1), k) 4= ẐT(k)R(k)Ẑ(k), (21)
where R(k) ∈ Rlzs×lzs is a positive-definite performance weighting. The goal is to determine refined controls
ˆ̃U(k − 1) that would have provided better performance than the controls U(k) that were applied to the
system. The refined control values ˆ̃U(k − 1) are subsequently used to update the controller.
II.C. Cost Function Optimization with Adaptive Regularization
To ensure that (21) has a global minimizer, we consider the regularized cost
J̄( ˆ̃U(k − 1), k) 4= ẐT(k)R(k)Ẑ(k) + η(k)R2 ˆ̃UT(k − 1) ˆ̃U(k − 1), (22)
where η(k) ≥ 0, and R2 ∈ R
ˆ̃U ≥ 0. Substituting (20) into (22) yields




= H̃TR(k)H̃ + η(k)R2IlŨ , (24)
B(k)
4
= 2H̃TR(k)[Z(k)− H̃Ũ(k − 1)], (25)
C(k)
4
= ZT(k)R(k)Z(k)− 2ZT(k)R(k)H̃Ũ(k − 1) + ŨT(k − 1)H̃TR(k)H̃Ũ(k − 1). (26)
If either H̃ has full column rank or η(k) > 0 and R2 > 0, then A(k) is positive definite. In this case,
J̄( ˆ̃U(k − 1), k) has the unique global minimizer








Mi(k)u(k − i) +
nc∑
i=1
Ni(k)y(k − i), (28)
where, for all i = 1, . . . , nc, Mi(k) ∈ Rlu×lu and Ni(k) ∈ Rlu×ly . The control (28) can be expressed as




= [M1(k) · · · Mnc(k) N1(k) · · · Nnc(k)] ∈ Rlu×nc(lu+lz) (30)
and




































































II.E. Recursive Least Squares Update of θ(k)







λk−i‖φT(i− d− 1)θT(k)− ûT(i− d)‖2 + λk(θ(k)− θ0)P−10 (θ(k)− θ0)T, (32)
where ‖ · ‖ is the Euclidean norm, and λ ∈ (0, 1] is the forgetting factor. Minimizing (32) yields
θT(k) = θT(k − 1) + β(k)P (k − 1)φ(k − d− 1) · [φT(k − d)P (k − 1)φ(k − d− 1) + λ(k)]−1
·[φT(k − d− 1)θT(k − 1)− ûT(k − d)],
where β(k) is either zero or one. The error covariance is updated by
P (k) = β(k)λ−1P (k − 1) + [1− β(k)]P (k − 1)− β(k)λ−1P (k − 1)φ(k − d− 1)
·[φT(k − d− 1)P (k − 1)φ(k − d) + λ]−1 · φT(k − d− 1)P (k − 1). (33)
We initialize the error covariance matrix as P (0) = αI3nc , where α > 0. Note that when β(k) = 0, θ(k) =
θ(k − 1) and P (k) = P (k − 1). Therefore, setting β(k) = 0 switches off the controller adaptation, and thus
freezes the control gains. When β(k) = 1, the controller is allowed to adapt.
III. RCAC Architectures
We consider two implementations of RCAC. In the first implementation, a single RCAC controller
block uses the performance (error) variables in order to adapt and command the various control surfaces
without knowledge of possible actuator degradation. In the second implementation, multiple RCAC subcon-
troller blocks are used to command the control surfaces, one dedicated to each control surface and without
knowledge of possible degradation of the control surface for which it is responsible. These architectures can
be viewed as centralized and constrained, respectively. Figure 1 shows block diagrams of both configurations.
The constrained architecture is motivated by the fact that having multiple SISO (in the case of a scalar error
variable) and MISO (in the case of vector error variable) RCAC control laws allows for each error-to-actuator
channel to have a different inital error covariance matrix, allowing for more flexible controller tuning. The
question that this section seeks to address is whether the separate RCAC subcontrollers in the constrained
architecture are able to adapt effectively during simultaneous operation despite the fact that axis coupling
is not modeled. A similar RCAC architecture for structural control is considered in [13].
III.A. Controller Architecture Comparison
In all examples, the controller gains are allowed to converge during initial level straight-line flight. At
200 sec, the aircraft is commanded to follow a 400-sec 90-deg heading command at the same time actuator
failure occurs. In all examples, a single tuning is used for the centralized architecture as well as for the
constrained architecture. For the centralized controller, the tuning parameters are
nc = 16, P0 = 0.08, pc = 0.1, η0 = 0.01 (34)
and
H̃ = H1 ∈ R1×3, (35)
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Figure 1. (a) Centralized and (b) constrained RCAC architectures. In the constrained architecture, each RCAC
controller is SISO, and the adaptation occurs separately in each block.
The Markov parameters are calculated based on a linearized model of GTM obtained using the Simulink
function linmod. For the constrained case, each RCAC subcontroller uses the tuning parameters
nc = 16, P0 = 0.1, pc = 0.1, η0 = 0.03 (36)
and
H̃ = H1 ∈ R1×1, (37)
where H1 may be different for each subcontroller. Note that the centralized and constrained architecture
require the same amount of prior modeling information. The centralized architecture uses a H̃ that is a 1×3
matrix, requiring estimation of three numbers. The constrained architecture uses three scalar matrices H̃,
also requiring estimation of three numbers.
III.A.1. Magnitude Saturation
We compare the performance of the centralized and constrained controllers with unknown magnitude
saturation. Figures 2 and 3 show how both controllers perform when the rudder deflection is suddenly sat-
urated within ± 0.5 deg. In all cases, both control architectures are able to follow the command.
Figure 4 shows the evolution of the adaptive gains. While the gains for the individual subcon-
trollers converge at different times, each is able to compensate for the adaptation of the two other sub-
controllers and together minimize the error. Table 1 summarizes the results for magnitude saturation.
III.A.2. Rate Saturation
We next compare the performance of the centralized and constrained controllers with unknown rate
saturation. Figures 5 and 6 show how both controllers perform when the rudder deflection is rate-saturated
within ±0.1 deg/sec. In this example, the constrained configuration is able to follow the command while the
centralized RCAC controller is not.
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Figure 2. Heading command using the centralized architecture, with the rudder deflection magnitude-saturated within
±0.5 deg at 200 sec. (a) Heading, (b) roll, (c) altitude, (d) sideslip, (e) aileron deflection, and (f) rudder deflection.
The centralized controller first attempts to command deflections of ±4 deg, and then adapts completely at 800 sec to
stay within saturation bounds.






















































































































Figure 3. Heading command using the constrained architecture, with the rudder deflection magnitude-saturated within
±0.5 deg at 200 sec. (a) Heading, (b) roll, (c) altitude, (d) sideslip, (e) aileron deflection, and (f) rudder deflection.
The constrained controller is able to follow the command, but produces an oscillatory response.
Table 2 summarizes the closed-loop performance for various rate-saturation limits. While both con-
trollers exhibit similar robustness, in one case the constrained architecture was successful while the centralized
controller was not.
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Saturation Range C,A Co,A C,R Co,R
(deg)
0 Y Y Y Y
1 Y Y Y Y
2 Y Y Y Y
3 Y Y Y Y
4 Y Y Y Y
5 Y Y Y Y
6 Y Y Y Y
7 Y Y Y Y
8 Y Y Y Y
9 Y Y Y Y
10 Y Y Y Y
Table 1. Summary of controller performance for saturated actuators. (C) Centralized RCAC, (Co) constrained RCAC,
(A) aileron saturated, and (R) rudder saturated. The notation used is, Y: the controller was able to track the command,
and N: the controller was not able to track the command. Both controllers peform similarly when actuator saturation
is present.
Maximum Rate C,A Co,A C,R Co,R
(deg/sec)
0.1 Y Y N Y
0.3 Y Y Y Y
0.5 Y Y Y Y
0.7 Y Y Y Y
0.9 Y Y Y Y
1.1 Y Y Y Y
1.3 Y Y Y Y
1.5 Y Y Y Y
1.7 Y Y Y Y
1.9 Y Y Y Y
2.1 Y Y Y Y
Table 2. Summary of controller performance for rate-saturated actuators. (C) Centralized RCAC, (Co) constrained
RCAC, (A) rate-saturated aileron, and (R) rate-saturated rudder. The notation used is, Y: the controller was able to
track the command, and N: the controller was not able to track the command. The centralized controller is not able to
control the aircraft when the rudder is rate saturated at ±0.1 deg/sec. The constrained controller follows the command
for all rate-saturation settings.
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Figure 4. Evolution of the adaptive gains for the centralized and constrained controllers for the case of rudder
magnitude-saturated within ±0.5 deg at 200 sec. (a) Constrained elevator subcontroller, (b) constrained aileron subcon-
troller, (c) constrained rudder subcontroller, and (d) centralized RCAC. Adaptive gains for the centralized controller
converge around 800 sec. Adaptive gains for the elevator, aileron, and rudder subcontrollers converge around 600 sec,
1400, and 270 sec, respectively.


















































































































Figure 5. Heading command using the centralized architecture, with rudder deflection rate-saturated within±0.1 deg/sec
at 200 sec. (a) Heading, (b) roll, (c) altitude, (d) sideslip, (e) aileron deflection, and (f) rudder deflection. At the
onset of the fault, the centralized controller drives the aircraft to perform aggressive oscillations in heading, eventually
settling on an incorrect heading.
III.A.3. Deadzone
We also compare controller performance with an unknown deadzone. Figures 7 and 8 show how both
controllers perform with a rudder deadzone range of ±2.5 deg. In this example, both control architectures
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Figure 6. Heading command using the constrained architecture, with rudder deflection rate-saturated within ±0.1
deg/sec at 200 sec. (a) Heading, (b) roll, (c) altitude, (d) sideslip, (e) aileron deflection, and (f) rudder deflection. The
three constrained controllers decrease the commanded actuator deflection rate in response to the rate-saturation limit.
The aircraft remains in proximity of the commanded heading angle and eventually reaches the commanded heading.
are able to follow the command.



























































































































Figure 7. Heading command using the centralized architecture, with a rudder deflection deadzone of ±2.5 deg at 200
sec. (a) Heading, (b) roll, (c) altitude, (d) sideslip, (e) aileron deflection, and (f) rudder deflection. At the onset
of the fault, the centralized controller increases aileron activity to compensate for the fault. The commanded rudder
deflection is also increased to overcome the deadzone.
Table 3 summarizes the closed-loop performance for various control surface deadzone widths. Both
controllers exhibit high robustness during the occurrence of deadzone faults in one of the actuators.
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Figure 8. Heading command using the constrained architecture, with a rudder deflection deadzone of ±2.5 deg at 200
sec. (a) Heading, (b) roll, (c) altitude, (d) sideslip, (e) aileron deflection, and (f) rudder deflection. At the onset of
the fault, the aileron subcontroller increases aileron activity to compensate for the fault. The rudder subcontroller also
increases the commanded rudder deflection to overcome the deadzone.
III.A.4. Jammed Control Surfaces
We compare controller performance when an actuator becomes jammed at an unknown deflection an-
gle. Figure 9 and 10 show how both controller perform with the aileron jammed at a deflection angle of −2
deg. The centralized architecture was able to follow the command while the constrained architecture was not.
Table 4 summarizes the closed-loop performance for actuators jammed at various angles. Overall, the
centralized controller is more successful than the constrained controllers.
IV. Robustness under Modeling Error
In the previous section, it was found that the centralized controller architecture is more reliable than
the constrained controller architecture for unknown actuator faults. Those test cases are based on accurate
modeling information from the linearized aircraft dynamics. In particular, Markov parameters were obtained





We then experimentally determined the Markov parameter choice i∗, where Hi∗ is the Markov parameter
that produces the best performance from RCAC. Note that i∗ may vary depending on the system dynamics
and the choice of commands and actuators. In reality, it may not be possible to identify i∗ or obtain an
accurate estimate of Hi∗ , therefore RCAC must maintain good performance for different choices of i and Hi.
In this section, we specify two cases of inaccurate prior modeling information. The first case assumes
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Deadzone Range C,A Co,A C,R Co,R
(deg)
0 Y Y Y Y
1 Y Y Y Y
2 Y Y Y Y
3 Y Y Y Y
4 Y Y Y Y
5 Y Y Y Y
6 Y Y Y Y
7 Y Y Y Y
8 Y Y Y Y
9 Y Y Y Y
10 Y Y Y Y
Table 3. Summary of controller performance for actuator deadzones. (C) Centralized RCAC, (Co) constrained RCAC,
(A) aileron deadzone, and (R) rudder deadzone. The notation used is, Y: the controller was able to track the command,
and N: the controller was not able to track the command. Both control architectures produced similarly robust
performance in the face of deadzone faults.
Jam Angle C,A Co,A C,R Co,R
(deg)
-5 N N N N
-4 N N N N
-3 N N N N
-2 Y N N N
-1 Y Y N N
0 Y Y Y Y
1 Y Y N N
2 Y N N N
3 N N N N
4 N N N N
5 N N N N
Table 4. Summary of controller performance for jammed actuators. (C) Centralized RCAC, (Co) constrained RCAC,
(A) aileron jammed, and (R) rudder jammed. The notation used is, Y: the controller was able to track the command,
and N: the controller was not able to track the command. The centralized controller performs as well or better when
an actuator is jammed, though neither controller is robust to a jammed rudder.
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Figure 9. Heading command using the centralized architecture, with a −2 deg aileron jam at 200 sec. (a) Heading, (b)
roll, (c) altitude, (d) sideslip, (e) aileron deflection, and (f) rudder deflection. At the onset of the fault, the centralized
controller immediately changes the rudder deflection to compensate for the jammed aileron.




















































































































Figure 10. Heading command using the constrained architecture, with a −2 deg aileron jam at 200 sec. (a) Heading,
(b) roll, (c) altitude, (d) sideslip, (e) aileron deflection, and (f) rudder deflection. The three constrained controllers
are not able to compensate for the fault.
that i∗ is not known, and H̃ can be given by an accurate estimate of Hi for any i. The second case assumes
that i∗ is not known, and H̃ is given solely by Hj , where j is a constant and therefore does not necessarily
equal i. For the scope of this paper, we assume that j = i∗.
We focus on testing the robustness of RCAC for the jammed actuator case. For all test cases, the
aircraft is given a zero-deg roll command instead of a change-of-heading command in order to directly address
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the rolling and pitching moments caused by aileron and rudder jam. The controller gains are first allowed
to converge during the inital level straight-line flight, and then the actuator failure occurs at 200 sec.
IV.A. Case 1: Erroneous Markov Parameter Choice
To determine how different Markov parameters can impact the performance of the controller, we
choose i = 1,2,3,4,5 and obtain Hi from the linearized system. We then test the robustness of RCAC under
each of the five Markov parameters in various angles of jammed actuator faults. For each Markov parameter,
an optimal tuning parameter is obtained to provide a baseline indication of the best achievable performance
of RCAC in each case. The optimal tunings for the first five Markov parameters are given by
H̃ = H1, i = 1, nc = 16, P0 = 0.01, η0 = 0.0003, (39)
H̃ = H2, i = 2, nc = 16, P0 = 0.003, η0 = 0.0007, (40)
H̃ = H3, i = 3, nc = 16, P0 = 0.0005, η0 = 0.0005, (41)
H̃ = H4, i = 4, nc = 16, P0 = 0.0003, η0 = 0.0005, (42)
H̃ = H5, i = 5, nc = 16, P0 = 0.001, η0 = 0.0007, (43)
We compare the performance of RCAC under each choice of Markov parameters, each tested at its
optimal tuning parameters. Figure 11 shows the performance of the controller using H2 under a −8-deg
jammed rudder deflection angle. Figure 12 shows the performance of the controller using H4 under a −6−deg
jammed aileron deflection angle.






















































































































Figure 11. Roll command with a −8 deg rudder jam at 100 sec, using H2 as prior modeling information. (a) Altitude,
(b) roll, (c) sideslip, (d) aileron deflection, (e) rudder deflection, and (f) adaptive gains. The adaptive gains of the
centralized controller change in response to the fault and converge within approximately 50 sec.
Table 5 summarizes the performance of RCAC under the first 5 Markov parameters at their optimal
tunings.
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Jam Angle (deg) H1,A H1,R H2,A H2,R H3,A H3,R H4,A H4,R H5,A H5,R
-10 N N N N N N N N N N
-9 N Y N N N N N N N N
-8 N Y N Y N Y N N N N
-7 N Y N Y N N N N Y N
-6 N Y N Y N Y Y Y N N
-5 N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
-4 N N N Y N Y Y Y Y Y
-3 N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
-2 N N N Y Y Y N Y Y Y
-1 N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
0 N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
1 N Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
2 N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
3 N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
4 N N N Y N Y Y Y N Y
5 N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
6 N N N Y N Y Y N N N
7 N Y N Y N Y N N Y Y
8 N Y N Y N Y N N N N
9 N N N Y N N N N N N
10 N N N N N N N N N N
Table 5. Summary of controller performance for jammed actuators. (H1) First Markov parameter, (H2) second Markov
parameter, (H3) third Markov parameter, (H4) fourth Markov parameter, (H5) fifth Markov parameter, (A) aileron
jammed, and (R) rudder jammed. The notation used is, Y: the controller was able to track the command, and N:
the controller was not able to track the command. H3, H4, H5 produce the best results. Both H1 and H2 exhibit low
robustness with respect to jammed aileron faults and high robustness with respect to jammed rudder faults. H4 and
H5 exhibit slightly lower robustness than H3 for jammed aileron and rudder faults.
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Figure 12. Roll command with a −6 deg aileron jam at 100 sec, using H4 as prior modeling information. (a) Altitude,
(b) roll, (c) sideslip, (d) aileron deflection, (e) rudder deflection, and (f) adaptive gains. The adaptive gains of the
centralized controller change in response to the fault and converge within approximately 50 sec.
IV.B. Case 2: Discrepancy between Markov Parameter Choice and H̃
To determine how a mismatch between i and Hi∗ can impact the performance of the controller, we
choose i = 1,2,3,4,5 and obtain Hi∗ = H3 from the linearized system. Keeping H̃ = H3 the same for each
simulation while varying i, we test the robustness of RCAC to jammed actuator faults. Note that Markov
parameter choice is used to determine the number of past time steps used to construct the retrospectively
optimized controls Û(k − 1), therefore RCAC may produce different outputs despite using the same H̃ .
For each Markov parameter, an optimal tuning parameter is obtained to provide a baseline indication
of the best achievable performance of RCAC in each case. The optimal tunings for the first five Markov
parameters are given by
H̃ = H3, i = 1, nc = 16, P0 = 0.001, η0 = 0.0007 (44)
H̃ = H3, i = 2, nc = 16, P0 = 0.003, η0 = 0.0007 (45)
H̃ = H3, i = 3, nc = 16, P0 = 0.0005, η0 = 0.0005, (46)
H̃ = H3, i = 4, nc = 16, P0 = 0.001, η0 = 0.001 (47)
H̃ = H3, i = 5, nc = 16, P0 = 0.001, η0 = 0.0009 (48)
We compare the performance of each choice of i while using the same H̃. Figure 13 shows the
performance of the controller using i = 5 under a −4-deg jammed aileron deflection angle. Figure 14 shows
the performance of the controller using i = 1 under an 8-deg jammed rudder deflection angle.
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Figure 13. Roll command with a −4 deg aileron jam at 100 sec, using H5 as prior modeling information. (a) Altitude,
(b) roll, (c) sideslip, (d) aileron deflection, (e) rudder deflection, and (f) adaptive gains. The adaptive gains of the
centralized controller change in response to the fault and converge within approximately 150 sec.




















































































































Figure 14. Roll command a 8 deg rudder jam at 100 sec, using H1 as prior modeling information. (a) Altitude, (b) roll,
(c) sideslip, (d) aileron deflection, (e) rudder deflection, and (f) adaptive gains. The adaptive gains of the centralized
controller change in response to the fault and converge within approximately 100 sec.
Table 6 summarizes the adaptive controller’s performance under the first 5 Markov parameters and
the same matrix H̃.
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Jam Angle (deg) H1,A H1,R H2,A H2,R H3,A H3,R H4,A H4,R H5,A H5,R
-10 N N N N N N N N N N
-9 N N N N N N N N N N
-8 N Y N Y N Y N N N N
-7 N Y N Y N N N Y N Y
-6 N Y N N N Y N Y N Y
-5 Y Y Y N Y Y N Y N Y
-4 Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y
-3 Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y
-2 Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
-1 N N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
0 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
1 N N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
2 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
3 N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
4 Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y
5 Y Y N Y Y Y N Y N Y
6 N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y
7 N Y N Y N Y N Y N N
8 N Y N N N Y N N N N
9 N Y N N N N N N N N
10 N N N N N N N N N N
Table 6. Summary of controller performance for jammed actuators. (H1) First Markov parameter, (H2) second Markov
parameter, (H3) third Markov parameter, (H4) fourth Markov parameter, (H5) fifth Markov parameter, (A) aileron
jammed, and (R) rudder jammed. The notation used is, Y: the controller was able to track the command, and N:
the controller was not able to track the command. Setting i = 3 produces the best results. i = 2 produced matching
robustness with respect to jammed rudder faults, while i = 1, 2, 4, 5 exhibit similar robustness with respect to jammed
aileron faults.
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We compared two implementations of RCAC for adaptive flight control of the NASA GTM model
under various unknown control-surface faults,. To compare the two controller architectures, we considered
the case in which heading is the performance variable and the elevator, ailerons, and rudder are subjected
to sudden unknown faults. The centralized RCAC controller is a 3x1 SIMO controller, whose gains are
updated by RCAC. In the constrained configuration, the gains of each controller are adapted independently
by three separate RCAC blocks. It was found that the centralized architecture exhibits increased robustness
to control-surface faults.
Both controllers were tested with four types of unknown actuator faults, namely, magnitude and rate
saturation, deadzone, and jams. In most cases, both controller architectures was able to follow a 90-deg
heading-change command over a wide range of unknown faults. The most challenging case was found to be a
jammed rudder, in which case neither the centralized nor the constrained controller was entirely successful.
In all but one case, centralized RCAC at least matches the performance of the constrained architecture, and
in a few cases exceeds it.
We also characterized the robustness of the centralized architecture with respect to prior modeling
information. We considered the case in which the roll angle is the performance variable and the aileron and
rudder are subjected to sudden unknown faults. The controller is first tested with respect to the first five
Markov parameters and their corresponding H̃. RCAC is then tested by using the same H̃ for the first five
Markov parameters.
The robustness of the controller was tested with respect to the jammed aileron and rudder fault.
In most cases, the controller was able to maintain a zero-deg roll command over a wide range of Markov
parameter choices and their corresponding H̃. When the matrix H̃ can be correctly identified from a given
choice of Markov parameter, we found that the controller performed best for Markov parameter choices
higher than the third Markov parameter. When the matrix H̃ is identified, but the corresponding Markov
parameter is uncertain, we found that the controllers produce similar performances. For the first case,
picking the incorrect Markov parameter can lead to a steep decline in the robustness of an actuator.
Future research will focus on further characterizing the robustness of RCAC, with the goal of obtaining
a rubric for maximizing the controller’s performance in the events of both uncertain actuator faults and prior
modeling information.
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